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Post-Miranda Selective Silence
A CONSTITUTIONAL DILEMMA WITH AN
EVIDENTIARY ANSWER
INTRODUCTION
When a defendant is arrested and invokes his
constitutional right to remain silent, the law explicitly prohibits
a prosecutor from commenting adversely on that silence during
the defendant’s trial.1 But what happens when a defendant,
after receiving a Miranda warning,2 does not actually remain
silent, but instead answers some of the officer’s questions but
not others? At trial, is the prosecutor permitted to argue that the
jury may draw an inference of guilt from the defendant’s
decision not to answer some questions, that is, the defendant’s
“selective silence”?3 Circuits are currently split on this issue.4
Courts’ treatment of selective silence has important
implications for defendants and law enforcement officials alike.
As the Supreme Court notes in Miranda, while recognizing the
importance of “protecting individual rights,” its “decision is not
intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in
investigating crime.”5 With those concerns in mind, this note
identifies a solution grounded in the Federal Rules of Evidence
to competing constitutional, practical, and policy concerns that
come into play if and when the Supreme Court addresses
selective silence. Specifically, it contends that while a suspect’s
selective silence is not constitutionally protected, courts may
rely on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and analogous state
1 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618-19 (1976) (citing United States v. Hale,
422 U.S. 171, 182-83 (1975)).
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68 (1966) (“At the outset, if a person
in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and
unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.”).
3 McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 2012).
4 Circuits that do not protect a defendant’s selective silence from being used
against him at trial include the First, Fifth and Eighth Circuits. Circuits that do
protect a defendant’s silence from being used against him at trial include the Seventh,
Ninth, and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 104-05.
5 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477, 481.
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provisions to adequately protect a defendant from unfair
prosecutorial use of selective silence. As the Supreme Court has
found that silence carries an inherently low probative value,
courts have room to aggressively apply Rule 403 and prohibit
such evidence when used in a misleading or unfair way.
Part I provides a brief background on the Fifth
Amendment and the constitutional right to remain silent. Part
II describes selective silence. Part III identifies two contrasting
lines of reasoning that have resulted in a circuit split over
whether a defendant’s selective silence is admissible at trial.
Part IV argues that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Miranda
suggests that selective silence should not be constitutionally
protected. Finally, Part V argues that Federal Rule of Evidence
403 and analogous state provisions provide sufficient protection
against creating unfair inferences of guilt through
prosecutorial use of post-Miranda selective silence.
I.

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND MIRANDA

The Fifth Amendment commands that no person “shall
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.”6 The Fifth Amendment privilege, however, is not
confined to the context of a courtroom; it applies in pre-trial
settings as well. The privilege “serves to protect persons in all
settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any
significant way from being compelled to incriminate
themselves.”7 The Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona in
1966 in response to reports of police compulsion and brutality by
holding that “the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation
of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination.”8 Specifically, the Court stated that “[p]rior to any
questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used
as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed.”9

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
8 Id. at 444; see also id. at 446-52 (discussing coercive and deceptive
interrogation techniques used by police forces).
9 Id. at 444.
6
7
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Due process considerations prohibit a suspect’s decision
to remain silent from being used against him at trial. As the
Supreme Court reasoned in Jenkins v. Anderson,
Miranda warnings inform a person that he has the right to remain
silent and assure him, at least implicitly, that his subsequent
decision to remain silent cannot be used against him. Accordingly, “it
does not comport with due process to permit the prosecution during
the trial to call attention to his silence at the time of arrest and to
insist that because he did not speak about the facts of the case at
that time, as he was told he need not do, an unfavorable inference
might be drawn as to the truth of his trial testimony.”10

As the Miranda court explained,
[o]nce warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear.
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown that he intends
to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege.11

A suspect, however, may also waive his Fifth Amendment
privilege “provided [that] the waiver is made voluntarily,
knowingly and intelligently.”12 For example, “[a]n express
statement that the individual is willing to make a statement and
does not want an attorney, followed closely by a statement could
constitute a waiver.”13 In addition, a defendant who sufficiently
demonstrates that he understands his right, and subsequently
responds to a question, could also constitute a waiver.14
II.

SELECTIVE SILENCE

For the purposes of this note post-Miranda “selective
silence” refers primarily to a defendant’s refusal to answer some,
but not all, of a police officer’s or investigator’s questions during
an interrogation in which the defendant initially waived his
right to silence.15 For example, a suspect in police custody, who
has been told of his right to remain silent under Miranda, may
unambiguously waive this right to silence, often by signing a
waiver, and begin to answer questions posed by officers.
10 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239-40 (1980) (citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426
U.S. 610, 619 (1976) (internal quotation marks omitted).
11 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74 (footnote omitted).
12 Id. at 444.
13 Id. at 475.
14 See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 382-87 (2010).
15 See Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010) (“A suspect may remain
selectively silent by answering some questions and then refusing to answer others . . . .”).
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Perhaps, however, the suspect does not wish to answer one of
the officer’s questions and declines to respond, but subsequently
continues to answer other questions. Had the defendant
requested that questioning stop and refused to answer any
further questions, his invocation of the right to silence would be
readily apparent. Accordingly, it would be a violation of the Fifth
Amendment for a prosecutor to introduce evidence of the
defendant’s silence at trial to draw an inference of guilt. In such
cases, the defendant’s silence is clearly entitled to protection.
Post-Miranda “selective silence” can also refer to a
defendant’s omission of details in an explanation or account of
events.16 In Anderson v. Charles, for example, the Court stated
that “[e]ach of two inconsistent descriptions of events may be
said to involve ‘silence’ insofar as it omits facts included in the
other version. But [prior Supreme Court decisions] do[ ] not
require any such formalistic understanding of ‘silence.’”17 For
the purposes of this note “selective silence” will refer to both a
defendant’s refusal to answer a question in the course of
interrogation and a defendant’s omission of relevant details
during an interrogation. Furthermore, for the purposes of this
note, “selective silence” will be distinguished from “pure
silence” where a defendant cuts off questioning entirely and
does not responded to any further questions.18
In determining whether selective silence is constitutionally
protected, circuit courts have struggled to define the scope of the
Fifth Amendment privilege; whether the privilege is absolute—
protecting all silence regardless of context—or whether the right to
silence must be intermittently invoked, waived, and re-invoked.
III.

CIRCUIT SPLIT

A.

Circuits That Have Permitted a Prosecutor to
Impeach/Draw Inferences from Selective Silence

Circuits that permit a prosecutor to draw inferences of
guilt from a defendant’s selective silence, such as the First,
Fifth, and Eighth Circuits,19 tend to focus solely on whether a
See Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 409 (1980).
Id.
18 See Thomas v. Indiana, 910 F.2d 1413, 1414, 1416 (7th Cir. 1990)
(referring to the defendant’s refusal to speak at all after being read his Miranda rights
as a case of “pure silence”).
19 See, e.g., McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 104-05
(3d Cir. 2012) (citing United States v. Andujar-Basco, 488 F.3d 549, 556 (1st Cir. 2007);
16

17
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suspect has invoked or waived his Fifth Amendment rights.
That is, they tend to focus on the suspect’s actions—whether
his behavior indicated an unambiguous intention to re-invoke
the right to silence—without reaching the constitutional issue
of whether selective silence is protected. This approach,
however, requires the court to infer a suspect’s intent from an
ambiguous response: silence.
For example, in the First Circuit case of United States v.
Goldman, FBI agents arrested a defendant for allegedly forging
a check.20 Prior to interrogation, the FBI investigator informed
the defendant of his rights under Miranda.21 The investigator
then gave the defendant a “Waiver of Rights” form, which
stated that, “I understand what my rights are. I am willing to
make a statement and answer questions . . . I understand and
know what I am doing.”22 The defendant signed the form and
began answering the interrogator’s questions.23 In the course of
the interrogation the defendant insisted that the check was not
forged, but that it contained “the genuine signature of [one of
his] business associate[s].”24 The interrogator, however, pointed
out that the defendant was also carrying four other blank
checks and asked why the business associate would give him
blank checks.25 The defendant explained that it had to do with
a transaction involving the business associate’s cousins.26 When
the interrogator followed up by asking for the names and
addresses of the cousins, the defendant did not respond.27 At
trial the prosecutor called the investigator as a witness and
elicited the following testimony:
Q: You inquired about those [blank] checks of [the defendant], am
I correct?
A: Yes, I did.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: Nothing, he didn’t respond.28

United States v. Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007); United States v.
Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002)).
20 United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 502 (1st Cir. 1977).
21 Id.
22 Id. at 503 & n.1.
23 Id. at 503.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 503 n.2.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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During his closing statement to the jury, the prosecutor
highlighted the defendant’s failure to respond to this question.29
The jury subsequently convicted the defendant of transporting a
forged check in interstate commerce.30 On appeal to the First
Circuit, the defendant objected to the prosecutor’s use of his
silence in response to this question, arguing that he had
exercised his right to silence, and that, under Miranda, the
prosecution was not entitled to introduce evidence of that silence
at trial.31 The First Circuit acknowledged that Miranda protects
a defendant when he has exercised his right to silence and that
a prosecutor would not be able to comment on that silence
during summation.32 The court determined, however, that “the
defendant did not stand on his rights. After hearing the Miranda
warnings, he chose to make an exculpatory statement, and he
answered most of the agent’s questions probing that statement.”33
By signing the waiver and offering an exculpatory explanation,
the defendant did not exercise his constitutional privilege.
The court also rejected the defendant’s argument that
he had reasserted his right to remain silent when he did not
respond to the interrogator’s question.34 The court noted that
although “Miranda clearly gives a suspect under interrogation
the right to indicate in any manner, at any time prior to or
during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent[,] [w]e can
find no passage in the record . . . where [the defendant] did
indicate that he wished to reassert his right to remain silent.”35
The court also noted that his decision to not answer the
question “was simply a strategic choice, perhaps based on the
fear that any answer might weaken the story.”36 Thus, in
holding that the defendant’s silence alone was insufficient to
re-invoke the right to silence, the court avoided the issue of
whether the Fifth Amendment afforded the defendant a right
to selectively answer questions.
Other circuits, in confronting the issue of selective
silence, have similarly avoided addressing the Fifth Amendment
issue by focusing on whether a defendant has sufficiently
invoked the right. For example in United States v. Burns, the
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id. at 503.
Id. at 502.
Id. at 503.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 504.
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
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Eighth Circuit, in allowing a defendant’s selective silence into
evidence, explained that “a defendant’s equivocal conduct
generally is not sufficient to invoke his or her fifth amendment
right to remain silent.”37 There, the defendant had been
arrested on suspicion of involvement in a fraudulent checkcashing scheme.38 The defendant was arrested, waived his
Miranda rights, and then began to answer questions put to him
by a United States Secret Service Agent.39 During the trial the
agent testified that the defendant admitted to cashing
fraudulent checks, but “when asked whether he had recruited
others to cash checks he did not respond and ‘just looked’ at
those questioning him.”40 The defendant, however, answered
subsequent questions and eventually requested that the
interrogation stop, at which point the interrogation ceased.41
In finding that the prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s
selective silence was permissible, the court reasoned “we do not
believe that [the defendant] invoked [his] constitutional right
when he was silent in response to a question.”42 The court
added that, “where the accused initially waives his or her right
to remain silent and agrees to questioning, but ‘subsequently
refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may note
the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise
admissible conversation between police and the accused.’”43
Like the Goldman court, the Eighth Circuit avoided addressing
the constitutional issue by focusing on the mechanics of
invoking the right to silence.44 Interestingly, however, the court
makes a formal distinction, determining that a defendant’s
selective silence cannot be viewed in isolation, but rather is a
United States v. Burns, 276 F.3d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 441.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 442.
43 Id. (quoting United States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1992)).
44 See United States v. Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 397 (5th Cir. 2007)
(holding that the defendant “waived his right to have the entire conversation, including
the implicit references to his silence contained therein, used against him as substantive
evidence of guilt”); United States v. Teleguz, 492 F.3d 80, 88 (1st Cir. 2007) (“A
defendant’s choice, after signing a Miranda waiver, to selectively answer questions, is not
in itself an unequivocal assertion of his right to remain silent.”); United States v. PinoNoriega, 189 F.3d 1089, 1098 (9th Cir. 1999) (finding the defendant’s selective silence
admissible since he waived his right by responding to the deputy’s questions); United
States v. Harris, 956 F.2d 177, 181 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting that once a defendant allows
questioning, but “subsequently refuses to answer further questions, the prosecution may
note the refusal because it now constitutes part of an otherwise admissible conversation
between the police and the accused”).
37

38
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part of the entire, unprotected conversation. In doing so, the
court acknowledges, implicitly, that there is a difference
between blanket silence and selective silence.
The problem with focusing on invocation and waiver in
the context of selective silence, is that silence, as the Supreme
Court itself admitted, is “insolubly ambiguous.”45 Therefore it
may be difficult to determine whether a suspect has in fact
invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. While a suspect who
says absolutely nothing after being given a Miranda warning
has clearly demonstrated his intention to invoke the right, the
same cannot be said of a suspect who merely avoids answering
one or two questions in the context of a larger interrogation; his
silence in this context is more ambiguous as to whether he has
invoked his right. Judicial decisions based on such ambiguous
behavior could lead to arbitrary and inconsistent results.
B.

Circuits That Have Prohibited a Prosecutor from
Drawing Inferences from a Defendant’s Selective Silence

In contrast to circuit courts that have allowed a
prosecutor to comment on or draw inferences of guilt from a
suspect’s selective silence, circuit courts that prohibit a
prosecutor from doing so—the Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth
Circuits46—approach the constitutional issue head on. These
courts emphasize that the right to silence is absolute, that it
need not be re-invoked. Simply, when a person is silent that
silence is protected, regardless of the context.
Take, for example, Hurd v. Terhune, where the Ninth
Circuit held that “Miranda does not apply only to specific
subjects or crimes. It applies to every question investigators
pose.”47 In Hurd, a defendant was convicted of murdering his
wife after a trial court allowed the prosecution to introduce into
evidence the defendant’s refusal during a police interrogation
to reenact his allegedly accidental shooting.48 The defendant
and his wife had separated about a month before her death.49
On the morning of the shooting, the defendant’s wife went to
the defendant’s home to pick up their two children.50 The
defendant and his wife were in an upstairs room when one of
45
46
47
48
49
50

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
McBride v. Superintendent, SCI Houtzdale, 687 F.3d 92, 104 (3d Cir. 2012).
Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080, 1087 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 1082-83.
Id. at 1083.
Id.
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their children heard a shot and then witnessed his mother
walk down the stairs and collapse.51 She had been shot in the
chest.52 Police arrested the defendant and informed him of his
Miranda rights.53 The defendant, however, agreed to talk and
told the police his version of what had happened.54 He claimed
that while they were upstairs that morning, his wife told him
that she was concerned about the possibility of riots following
the pending Rodney King verdict.55 The defendant told
investigators that he agreed to give his wife a gun so that she
could protect herself and that “it accidentally discharged” while
he was inspecting it.56 The police then asked the defendant to
demonstrate how the shooting occurred. The defendant refused,
but continued to talk to the investigators.57 Throughout the
remainder of the investigation, the investigators continued to
ask the defendant to demonstrate how the shooting happened
and the defendant refused each time.58
At a pre-trial suppression hearing, the defendant argued
that in refusing to reenact the shooting he had invoked his
constitutional right to remain silent and that, accordingly, this
part of the interrogation could not be put before the jury.59 The
trial court, however, denied the defendant’s motion and allowed
the prosecutor to refer to the defendant’s “refusal to reenact the
shooting as affirmative evidence of his guilt” throughout the
trial.60 The prosecutor subsequently counted to the jury how
many times the defendant refused to reenact the shooting.61
The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the trial
court’s decision, holding that the defendant’s rights were
“substantially and injuriously affected by the prosecutor’s
multiple references to his post-Miranda silence at trial.”62 The
court explained that “the right to silence is not an all or
nothing proposition. A suspect may remain selectively silent by
answering some questions and then refusing to answer others
without taking the risk that his silence may be used against
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1084.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1091.
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him at trial.”63 Specifically, the court emphasized that Miranda
“applies to every question investigators pose.”64 In essence,
then, all silence is protected, regardless of whether the
defendant is completely silent or partially silent.65
The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. May, similarly
recognized that a defendant’s selective silence is constitutionally
protected, but nonetheless allowed the prosecutor to present the
jury with evidence of the defendant’s selective silence by making
a subtle distinction between an inference of guilt and an
impeachment by the prosecutor. There, the court held that
“when a defendant is ‘partially silent’ by answering some
questions and refusing to answer others, this partial silence does
not preclude him from claiming a violation of his due process
rights under Doyle.”66 In May, the defendant was charged with
conspiracy after his associate was arrested for attempting to
purchase a kilogram of cocaine from an undercover officer.67 The
defendant was at the scene of the purchase and was carrying a
firearm.68 Police then searched the defendant’s home, business,
and vehicles and discovered 220 grams of cocaine.69 After his
arrest, the defendant “made several statements to the police
which contained both contradictions and omissions.”70
Specifically, he told police that on the night of his arrest he had
carried money to give to the other person so that the other
person could use it to buy cocaine.71
To defend against the conspiracy charges at trial, the
defendant testified that he withdrew from the conspiracy prior to
the time of his arrest.72 Noting that the defendant never
mentioned any withdrawal from the conspiracy during his postarrest interrogations with police, the prosecutor stated to the jury:
Never once did [the defendant] say [to the authorities], [Y]ou know,
on the 28th or the 27th, I actually got out of this deal. I stopped
doing this, police. I—you know, I got out of this. That was never in
any of the [previous] stories. Never once did he ever tell the police
the story of a day or two before I got caught, I decided to get out.
Id. at 1087.
Id.
65 Id. at 1087-88. The court went on to find, however, that the defendant had
invoked his right to silence. See id. at 1088-89.
66 United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 890 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing United
States v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483, 486 (10th Cir. 1993)).
67 Id. at 886.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id.
71 Id. at 886-87.
72 Id. at 887.
63
64
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That story only came up today. Now [after his arrest], he talked with
Ken Coffey, and when he talked to Agent Coffey right after his
arrest, he again repeated this story. He said, I was only trying to
help [the other person who was arrested]. You know she needed the
money. I had fired her. I was trying to help her get some money. He
didn’t even say then that the day or two before he decided not to do
it. That has only come up now, now that he has a lawyer, now that
he sees withdrawal as a legal defense. 73

Reviewing for plain error, the court found that the
prosecutor’s comments “were not ‘manifestly intended’ to be a
comment on defendant-appellant’s ‘partial silence’ nor would the
jury ‘naturally and necessarily’ take them as such.”74 Instead,
the court held that the comments “were designed to call
attention to prior inconsistent statements” and therefore did not
amount to a constitutional violation.75
Yet, it seems impossible to separate the inferences of
guilt (the implication that if he was truly innocent he would
have said something to the police) from the intent to impeach
(he did not say it then, but he did say it now). It could be argued
that both interpretations of the prosecutor’s intent are equally
valid. In interpreting the comments in this way, perhaps the
court recognized that such use of the defendant’s selective
silence was not fundamentally unfair.76 Certainly the court
would not have allowed the prosecutor to make such an
impeachment if the defendant had remained “purely” silent, that
is, said nothing at all to investigators.77 Regardless, the court
was acknowledging that there is a significant difference between
selective silences, in this case by omission, and “pure silence.”
In sum, while some circuit courts maintain that there is a
constitutionally protected right to selective silence, they very
often still seem inclined to allow the prosecutor to use the silence
at trial. This unwillingness on the part of the circuit courts to
strongly stand by the right to selective silence indicates a
lukewarm endorsement of the right. Thus, neither line of circuit
court decisions presents a satisfying solution to whether the
Constitution does, or should, protect a suspect’s selective silence.

Id. (some alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 890.
75 Id.
76 Id. (holding that “such comments do not constitute a violation of [the
defendant’s] due process rights under Doyle”).
77 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976); see also Thomas v. Indiana,
910 F.2d 1413, 1414, 1416 (7th Cir. 1990) (referring to the defendant’s refusal to speak
at all after being read his Miranda rights as a case of “pure silence”).
73

74
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SELECTIVE SILENCE SHOULD NOT BE
CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED

A close reading of Miranda and its progeny suggests
that selective silence should not be constitutionally protected.
Miranda, as discussed above, holds that the prosecution is
barred from using a defendant’s statements made during a
custodial interrogation against the defendant unless the
defendant was effectively informed of his privilege against selfincrimination and waives that privilege.78 The rule is meant to
protect a defendant who is unaware that he possesses a right
under the Fifth Amendment from being “compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.”79 The Miranda
Court, however, does not clearly indicate whether the right can
be intermittently waived and invoked, again and again,
throughout an interrogation. The plain language of Miranda
suggests that the right to silence cannot be exercised in this onand-off-again manner.80 The Court refers to the right of silence
during interrogation as “the right to ‘cut off’ questioning.”81
According to the Court, “[i]f the individual indicates in any
manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he
wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease.”82 It
appears, therefore, that the Court did not contemplate that the
right could or should apply to a defendant who does not cut off
questioning, but instead chooses to selectively answer the
interrogator’s questions.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s concern for fairness
in Doyle v. Ohio is not applicable to selective silence. In Doyle
v. Ohio, decided 10 years after Miranda, the Supreme Court
held that a prosecutor cannot use post-Miranda silence to
impeach a defendant’s testimony.83 The Court emphasized:
[W]hile it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express
assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such
circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
U.S. CONST. amend. V; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 442.
80 See Gerardo Schiano, Note, “You Have the Right to Remain Selectively
Silent”: The Impractical Effect of Selective Invocation of the Right to Remain Silent, 38
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 177, 189-90 (2012).
81 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474.
82 Id. at 473-74.
83 Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976).
78
79
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of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to
impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.84

In Doyle, the Court focused on the fact that the
government had induced the defendant’s silence by making
assurances that the silence would not be used against him.85
But in cases of post-Miranda selective silence, it is hard to
argue that the Government has induced a defendant’s silence.
Miranda requires that, “if a person in custody is to be subjected
to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and
unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. For
those unaware of the privilege, the warning is needed simply to
make them aware of it . . . .”86 Remain is an important word in
this warning and is commonly understood to mean: “To
continue in one place, condition, or character” or “To endure or
last; abide.”87 A suspect, therefore, is not warned that he or she
has a right to be intermittently silent, or a right to only answer
select questions. While the right to “remain silent” could be
relative to each question posed by an interrogator, such a
reading would also require that the prosecutor cut off
questioning, perhaps a severe consequence in the context of
most instances of selective silence.
In Anderson v. Charles, the Court also alluded to this
notion, stating
Doyle does not apply to cross-examination that merely inquires into
prior inconsistent statements. Such questioning makes no unfair use
of silence, because a defendant who voluntarily speaks after
receiving Miranda warnings has not been induced to remain silent.
As to the subject matter of his statements, the defendant has not
remained silent at all.88

If selective silence is an inseparable part of an otherwise
admissible conversation, as the Eighth Circuit has held,89 then a
suspect’s inconsistencies as well as his selective silence should
be admissible as neither would make unfair use of his silence.

Id.
Doyle, 426 U.S. at 619; see also Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605 (1982)
(per curiam) (“[W]e held in Doyle v. Ohio . . . that because of the nature of Miranda
warnings it would be a violation of due process to allow comment on the silence which
the warnings may well have encouraged.”);
86 Miranda, 384 US at 467-68 (emphasis added).
87 FUNK & WAGNALLS NEW COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF
THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1065 (encyclopedic eds., 1978) (citing definitions 2 & 4).
88 Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S 404, 408 (1980) (per curiam).
89 See supra Part III.A
84
85
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A defendant’s decision to speak in post-Miranda
interrogation is analogous to the decision to put a defendant or
witness on the stand during trial—a strategic choice, perhaps. In
this sense, it is not unfair to use a defendant’s post-Miranda
silence at trial. In Jenkins v. Anderson, the Court stated:
A defendant may decide not to take the witness stand because of the
risk of cross-examination. But this is a choice of litigation tactics. Once a
defendant decides to testify, the interests of the other party and regard
for the function of courts of justice to ascertain the truth become
relevant, and prevail in the balance of considerations determining the
scope and limits of the privilege against self-incrimination.90

Similarly, a defendant who decides to waive his right to a
lawyer and his right to silence by speaking to an officer has
made a tactical decision to “cast aside his cloak of silence.”91 Like
a witness who has agreed to testify in court, he has altered the
“scope and limits of [his] privilege against self-incrimination.”92
More recently, in Berghuis, the Court held that “a
suspect who has received and understood the Miranda
warnings, and has not invoked his Miranda rights, waives the
right to remain silent by making an uncoerced statement to the
police.”93 In that case, a defendant faced interrogation about a
shooting.94 Prior to the interrogation, officers informed the
defendant of his Miranda rights.95 Officers then posed questions
to the defendant, who gave only “a few limited verbal
responses . . . such as ‘yeah,’ ‘no,’ or ‘I don’t know.’”96 The
defendant, according to the Court, remained “‘[l]argely’ silent
during the interrogation, which lasted about three hours.”97
Approximately two hours and forty-five minutes into the
interrogation, however, an officer asked the defendant, “Do you
believe in God?”98 The defendant’s eyes “well[e]d up with tears.”99
The interrogating officer then asked, “Do you pray to God to
forgive you for shooting that boy down?”100 The defendant

90 Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 388-89 (2010).
94 Id. at 374.
95 Id. at 374-75.
96 Id. at 375.
97 Id. (alteration in original).
98 Id.
99 Id. (alteration in original).
100 Id.
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“answered ‘Yes’ and looked away.”101 His statements were
admitted at trial, and the jury subsequently found him guilty.102
The Supreme Court rejected the defendant’s argument
that he had unambiguously invoked his right to silence under the
Fifth Amendment “by not saying anything for a sufficient period
of time.”103 The defendant, according to the Court, “did not say
that he wanted to remain silent or that he did not want to talk
with police. Had he made either of these simple, unambiguous
statements he would have invoked ‘his right to cut off
questioning.’”104 Thus, the Court held that “[w]here the
prosecution shows that a Miranda warning was given and that it
was understood by the accused, an accused’s uncoerced statement
establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent.”105
While the Court’s decision in Berghuis suggests that a
defendant who remains selectively silent has not invoked a Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent and cut off questioning, it
does not address whether that silence can be used against the
defendant at trial. After all, in Berghuis, the prosecution was
attempting to admit the defendant’s post-Miranda statements
not his silence. Thus, whether a defendant’s silence is protected
regardless of waiver or invocation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege remains unanswered by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, protecting selective silence would impede
effective law enforcement.106 Under Miranda a police officer is
required to “cut off questioning” immediately when a defendant
invokes his Fifth Amendment privilege.107 If the defendant’s
refusal to answer a select question constitutes an invocation of
the right to silence, then the interrogator must cut off
questioning. Considerations like this would likely interfere with
important fact finding.108 As the Berghuis Court noted, “[i]f an
ambiguous act, omission, or statement could require police to
end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult
decisions about an accused’s unclear intent and face the
consequence of suppression ‘if they guess wrong.’”109
One could argue, however, that a defendant’s selective
silence would only require the prosecutor to cut off questioning
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id.
Id. at 376, 378.
Id. at 380-81.
Id. at 382.
Id. at 384.
See Schiano, supra note 80, at 193.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
See Schiano, supra note 80, at 193-94.
Berghuis, 560 U.S. 370, 382 (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994)).
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about the particular subject matter that led to the defendant’s
silence. This conceptualization, however, might provide police
officers and interrogators little guidance as they try to make
spur-of-the-moment decisions about what is a sufficiently
different subject or line of questioning. As a result, they might
be hesitant to ask critical questions, or continue to follow up on
a particularly important line of questioning. Moreover, if the
solution to this problem is to say that Miranda does not compel
an interrogator to cut off questioning, but the Fifth
Amendment proscribes the use of silence against a defendant
at trial, another problem will follow: a defendant will, in
essence, have editorial power over the interrogation. The jury
and judge will see and hear only what he wishes them to see or
hear, and will not be able to evaluate his selective silence,
something that, given the context of selective silence, the fact
finder is qualified to do.
V.

A COURT’S DECISION TO ADMIT SELECTIVE SILENCE
SHOULD BE MADE PURSUANT TO FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 403 AND ANALOGOUS STATE PROVISIONS

Although the use of selective silence may be
constitutionally permissible, courts have a practical and
workable solution at their disposal to prohibit or permit a
prosecutor from drawing inferences of guilt to the jury from a
suspect’s selective silence. That is, courts should rely on
evidentiary rules, specifically Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
analogous state provisions110 to determine whether a
defendant’s “selective silence” should be admitted into evidence
at trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 403 states, “The court may
exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.”111 Using Federal Rule of Evidence 403, courts should,
sua sponte, balance the probative value of the defendant’s
110 At least forty-three states have adopted a similar or identical provision to
FRE 403. See 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL
EVIDENCE: COMMENTARY ON RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED STATES COURTS T-3843 (2d ed. 2013) (reporting forty-two states that have adopted a similar or identical
provision); see also People v. Scarola, 525 N.E.2d 728, 732 (N.Y. 1988) (“[Relevant
evidence] may still be excluded by the trial court in the exercise of its discretion if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it will unfairly prejudice
the other side or mislead the jury.”).
111 FED. R. EVID. 403.
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selective silence against the risk of unfair prejudice. This
approach will be a practical, effective, and, ultimately, more fair
way than the approaches discussed above to determine whether
a defendant’s selective silence should be admissible in court.
A.

Selective Silence under Federal Rule of Evidence 403
1. The Probative Value of Selective Silence

It is well established that silence has a low probative
value. In United States v. Hale, the Court stated, “[i]n most
circumstances silence is so ambiguous that it is of little
probative force.”112 One year later, in United States v. Doyle, the
Court explained that “every post-arrest silence is insolubly
ambiguous.”113 After all, a defendant in custody has been
advised of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and that
“anything he says may be used against him.”114 Thus, the Doyle
court reasoned that “[s]ilence in the wake of these warnings may
be nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda
rights.”115 Indeed, the government has “induced” the defendant’s
silence and it would be fundamentally unfair to then use the
defendant’s silence against him or her at trial. The defendant is
also made immediately aware that he does not have to answer
and therefore may choose not to at that moment. Moreover, as
the Supreme Court noted in Dickerson v. United States,
“Miranda has become embedded in routine police practice to the
point where the warnings have become part of our national
culture.”116 An innocent person, therefore, may choose to remain
silent simply because he or she is aware that remaining silent is
the most prudent thing to do in such a circumstance.
Silence, however, depending on the context, is not always
ambiguous. In many cases we would expect an innocent person
to speak up, and in such instances silence has been said to have
meaning. For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence consider
silence, in some instances, to be an adoptive admission—a
statement for the purposes of the Hearsay Rule.117 The Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 801 state that “[u]nder established
principles an admission may be made by adopting or acquiescing
112
113
114
115
116
117

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
Id.
Id.
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
See FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) and advisory committee’s note.
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in the statement of another. . . . When silence is relied upon, the
theory is that the person would, under the circumstances,
protest the statement made in his presence, if untrue.”118 Indeed,
in Hale the Court emphasized that “[s]ilence gains more
probative weight where it persists in the face of accusation, since
it is assumed in such circumstances that the accused would be
more likely than not to dispute an untrue accusation.”119 While
the Advisory Committee acknowledges that it is problematic to
infer meaning from silence in the criminal context, when a
person has been advised of his right to remain silent, the
Committee states that “[t]he decision in each case calls for an
evaluation in terms of probable human behavior.”120 The Advisory
Committee underscores an important point: the meaning of a
defendant’s silence is dependent upon context and will typically
be a fact-sensitive question. Accordingly, the probative value of
“selective silence” should be analyzed in terms of its context.
Selective silence, unlike “pure silence,”121 is arguably not
“insolubly ambiguous”122 because of the context in which it
occurs. First, the innocent reasons for a defendant’s silence, such
as simply invoking the right or exercising prudence under the
right to silence, are not evident in this context. The defendant,
arguably, has not invoked his right to silence; he has started
speaking. It can no longer be said that the defendant’s silence
has no meaning other than evincing an intent to exercise a right.
Second, whereas “pure silence” provides little expressive context
or substance from which to draw inferences, selective silence
occurs within a richer expressive context from which a jury can
gauge the credibility of a defendant, and perhaps draw meaning
from the silence. A defendant’s refusal to answer one question
among many questions carries with it an inference or a
meaning. That is, the defendant’s other statements may provide a
sufficient context to understand why the defendant has decided
not to answer. It is arguably no longer unfair to “evaluat[e] in
terms of probable human behavior” what the defendant’s silence
may indicate.123 Unlike “pure silence,” there is an inference to be
118 Id. The Advisory Committee acknowledges, however, that an inference from
silence to guilt may be weak: “In criminal cases, however, troublesome questions have
been raised by decisions holding that failure to deny is an admission: the inference is a
fairly weak one, to begin with; silence may be motivated by advice of counsel or
realization that ‘anything you say can be used against you.’” Id.
119 United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 176 (1975).
120 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
121 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
122 See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976).
123 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note.
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made in this context, and a defendant’s selective silence does
carry more probative value.
Circuit courts have indicated that selective silence
carries more probative weight than “pure silence” due to
contextual factors. For example, in United States v. Goldman,
discussed above, the First Circuit noted that “[w]hat [the
defendant] said [during the ‘exculpatory story’ delivered during
his interrogation following the waiver of his Miranda rights]
provided a context that enhanced the probative value of his
silent response to a particular question.”124 In United States v.
Agee, the Third Circuit stated that when a defendant “simply
did not remain silent regarding the facts of the crime with
which he was charged . . . what he chose to do and say when he
approached the police officer provided a context which
emphasized the probative value of what he chose not to say to
the police.”125 There, the court allowed the prosecutor to
comment on the defendant’s silence, finding that the defendant
had not sufficiently invoked his right.
United States v. Pando Franco, a case decided by the
Fifth Circuit, demonstrates that a defendant’s selective silence,
even through omission, will have significant probative value. In
Pando Franco, officials stopped a defendant when he entered
the United States from Mexico.126 The defendant was driving a
van with a trailer attached that contained a “shoddily made”
wooden table.127 Officers scanned the table with a density meter
and discovered abnormally high-density areas along the edges
of the table.128 They drilled into the table and found 17.4
kilograms of marijuana.129 The defendant was arrested, but was
not told specifically that he had been arrested as a result of the
drugs found in the table.130 The defendant received a Miranda
warning and was subsequently interviewed.131 During the
interview he told officers about the price of fuel, his trip, his
destination, and that he was delivering the table to someone in
Oklahoma. Next, “[w]ithout any prompting from the officers,
[defendant] then stated, ‘that’s where my mistake is,
specifically agreeing to transport the table.’”132
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132

United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 504 (1st Cir. 1977)).
United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1977) (emphasis added).
United States v. Pando Franco, 503 F.3d 389, 391 (5th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 392.
Id.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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At trial, the prosecutor made several references to the
fact that the defendant had failed during the interview to ask
why he had been arrested.133 Had the defendant said nothing at
all, his blanket silence would have had little or no probative
value. However, in choosing to speak, the defendant, not only
incriminated himself, but also boosted the probative value of
his failure to ask why he had been arrested.
Thus, selective silence in context, unlike “pure silence,”
is not “insolubly ambiguous.” Rather, the probative value of
selective silence will vary with the circumstances and
substance of the interrogation. Courts are equipped to evaluate
these circumstances and determine the probative value of a
defendant’s selective silence on a case-by-case basis.
2. Danger of Unfair Prejudice
Using a defendant’s “selective silence” at trial to draw
inferences of guilt certainly carries the potential to unfairly
prejudice a defendant. In Hale, the Court commented that:
[t]he danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more weight to the
defendant’s previous silence than is warranted. And permitting the
defendant to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to overcome
the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to draw from the fact
that the defendant remained silent at the time of his arrest. 134

Indeed, a jury may not be as acutely aware or cognizant
of the effect of Miranda warnings on a defendant that may
induce the defendant to be silent. Or, perhaps a prosecutor could
twist the defendant’s silence and ask the jury to make unfair
inferences. As the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Evidence warns, when silence is motivated by an awareness of
one’s rights under Miranda, “unusual opportunity is afforded to
manufacture evidence.”135 In other words, the prosecutor can
suggest that the silence means whatever he wants it to mean.
Thus, in most cases a defendant’s selective silence will carry a
high risk of unfair prejudice.
Because the probative value and risk of unfair prejudice
varies widely among instances of selective silence, courts are
Id.
United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
135 FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B) advisory committee’s note. While use of a
defendant’s “pure silence” would seem to clearly implicate the Fifth Amendment’s
provision that a person may not be compelled to testify against himself, the implication is
not as clear in the context of “selective silence.” After all, the defendant has, arguably, not
remained silent. And a refusal to answer a question can constitute a statement.
133
134
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bound to reach widely varied results depending on context.
While there is potential for some inconsistency in making these
evidentiary determinations, it would be no more inconsistent
than when a court attempts to determine whether a suspect
sufficiently re-invoked a right to silence in order to admit or
exclude selective silence. Each approach seems equally prone to
inconsistent and fact-sensitive results. But in making a
determination pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 403, the
court will be considering, in large part, the fairness, or
unfairness, of the grounds for admission, as opposed to simply
whether the suspect formally or mechanistically invoked the
right, an inquiry that could lead to arbitrary results. By focusing
on the fairness, potential prejudice, and probative value of the
evidence, the court will be able to render decisions that permit a
police officer to vigorously interrogate suspects within the
bounds of the law, while in some instances protecting a
defendant from prosecutorial misuse of that selective silence.
B.

Is a Specialized Federal Rule of Evidence Barring the
Use of Silence at Trial Necessary to Reach Fair and
Consistent Results?

In analyzing selective silence under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, it is instructive to consider a proposal by Professor
Mikah K. Story Thompson, who argues that a defendant’s silence
has so little probative value and such a high risk of prejudice that
a new specialized rule of evidence should be adopted that bars
evidence of pre-trial silence.136 The proposed rule reads:
Evidence of a criminal defendant’s pre-trial failure to communicate
with law enforcement is not admissible in a criminal proceeding on
behalf of any party, when offered to (1) prove the defendant’s guilt
for the crime charged; (2) establish the defendant’s adoption of an
accusation by law enforcement under Rule 801(d)(2)(B); or (3)
impeach a testifying defendant through a prior inconsistent
statement or contradiction under Rule 613.137

While this approach seems quite effective in dealing
with “pure silence,” it fails to take into account the relatively
higher probative value that may exist in many instances of
selective silence and underscores differences between selective
silence and “pure silence.”138 In the case of selective silence, the
136 Mikah K. Story Thompson, Methinks the Lady Doth Protest Too Little:
Reassessing the Probative Value of Silence, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV 21, 53, 55 (2008).
137 Id.
138 See supra Part V.A.1.
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specialized rule will benefit a defendant who tries to deceive
authorities while impairing legitimate police work and society’s
interest in truth at trial. An examination of United States v.
Agee under Professor Thompson’s proposed special rule
illustrates this possibility. In Agee, a defendant was pulled over
for a traffic violation while driving with one passenger.139
Police, who were suspicious of the defendant, began to ask him
if there were drugs in the car.140 The defendant denied
possessing any drugs, and then attempted to direct the police
to the trunk of his car to prove that he had no drugs.141 The
police, however, went straight to the car’s passenger
compartment and found heroin underneath a seat.142 At trial,
the defendant admitted that he was aware of the drugs inside
the car, but claimed that they belonged to his passenger, who
had only revealed that he was carrying drugs moments before
they were pulled over.143 The defendant claimed that the
passenger “throwed [sic] a bag of silver foil bag [sic] over across
over [sic] to me and I picked it up. I was going to throw it back
on him” but instead “I put it under my seat.” 144
The prosecutor cross-examined Agee on why he failed to
tell the police that he knew about the drugs and that they
belonged to his passenger.145 During summation, “[t]he
prosecutor reviewed Agee’s account of what he did and did not
tell the police prior to his arrest.”146 Agee argued on appeal that
these references to his silence were improper.147 The court,
however, rejected Agee’s argument, in part, since “it was this
attempted deception, not Agee’s ‘silence,’ that was emphasized
by the prosecutor in her summation.”148
Applying the specialized rule to this situation would
result in the opposite outcome. Part one of the rule would
prohibit the prosecutor from using the defendant’s omission
while he was pulled over to draw an inference of guilt. And part
two of the rule would prohibit the prosecutor from using the
defendant’s omission to even point out the defendant’s
deceitfulness—that is, to impeach him. Thus, applying the
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148

United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 351-52 (1979).
Id. at 352.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 353.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 354.
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specialized rule to the facts of Agee would result in a windfall to
the defendant who has tried to deceive police. In the context of
selective silence, courts should therefore apply Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 as it exists, making decisions on a case-by-case
basis in light of each set of unique facts.
C.

Relying on Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and Analogous
State Provisions Will Resolve Policy Concerns

Miranda’s holding was, in part, a response to concerns
about interrogations that occurred in secret and were often
accompanied by “physical brutality and violence,”149 on the part
of the police. The Miranda Court was worried about
psychological coercion as well as physical coercion during an
interrogation.150 The Court noted examples of beatings, and
protracted questioning that were used to extract confessions, as
well as studies such as the Wickersham Report and the
Commission on Civil Rights, which pointed to an alarming
history of police violence.151 Moreover, the Court was especially
concerned that physical and psychological coercion went on
behind closed doors and that it is difficult to know what really
happens in the interrogation room.152 Thus, the Court
concluded that, “[u]nless a proper limitation upon custodial
interrogation is achieved[,] . . . there can be no assurance that
practices of this [brutal and violent] nature will be eradicated
in the foreseeable future.”153 Indeed, informing a defendant of
his rights and protecting his decision not to say anything at all
furthers these goals. But allowing a defendant to edit his own
story and to answer questions based on a “strategic choice”154
does not further this goal. Rather, as discussed above, it could
harmfully impede the truth-seeking function of the courts.
The Miranda Court instructed that “[t]he limits we have
placed on the interrogation process should not constitute an
undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement.”155
Moreover, the “decision is not intended to hamper the
traditional function of police officers in investigating crime.”156
However, as discussed above, relying only on Federal Rule of
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1966).
Id. at 448.
Id. at 445-46.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447.
United States v. Goldman, 563 F.2d 501, 504 (1st Cir.1977).
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 481.
Id. at 477.
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Evidence 403 will relieve the burden on police. That is, police
will be able to engage in fact-finding without worrying about
parsing out what constitutes a sufficient invocation or waiver
of the right. The nature of the testimony and its admissibility
can be determined on a case-by-case basis.
D.

Federal Rule 403 Will Be More Practical to Implement in
Situations Where the Court Is Called Upon to Determine
the Admissibility of “Selective Silence”

It appears that courts have struggled to determine what
constitutes a valid waiver or invocation of the right to silence.157
In Miranda, the Court stated, “[p]rior to any questioning, the
person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent
[and] that any statement he does make may be used as
evidence against him.”158 However, “[t]he defendant may waive
effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”159 Determining
whether the statement was made knowingly and intelligently,
especially in instances where a defendant has remained
selectively silent, can be a difficult undertaking.
The primary difficulty is that the court must deal with
the defendant’s contradictory behavior. In many instances, the
defendant has explicitly waived the right to silence by signing a
paper attesting that he has done so voluntarily, knowingly, and
intelligently. The defendant then, during the course of the
interrogation, may simply refuse to answer one of many
otherwise permissible questions.
Instead of focusing on waiver or invocation of the right,
the courts should focus on the substance and context of what
was actually said or not said, and weigh its probative value
against the risk of unfair prejudice in order to determine
admissibility at trial. Allowing post-Miranda selective silence
to be used at trial, only so long as it satisfies Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, will avoid the difficult task of determining when
a person has invoked or waived his right to silence. The courts
will not have to engage in a task that may be practically
difficult, and potentially arbitrary. Instead, the focus will be on
the merits of what was actually said, and not said, rather than
on whether a mechanical invocation or waiver was made.
157
158
159

See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
Id.
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This way, courts will have flexibility, but that flexibility
will be exercised where it counts, on the issue of fairness. Rather
than creating an absolute rule on admissibility or inadmissibility,
courts will be equipped to make fair determinations on the facts of
each particular case. Thus, a case-by-case balancing of the
probative value of particular instances of selective silence against
their likely prejudicial effect will be practical, easier to
administer, and likely to result in a more consistent and fair
admission and exclusion of evidence.160
E.

Case Studies: The Court Has Used Rule 403 Balancing
to Effectively Resolve Selective Silence Issues
1. United States v. Hale

The Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Hale is
especially instructive because there, the Court balanced the
probative value of a defendant’s pure silence against the risk of
confusing the jury, finding that the prosecutor impermissibly
cross-examined a suspect about his silence.161 In Hale, decided in
1975, a defendant was arrested for robbery.162 He was
subsequently taken to a police station and advised of his right to
remain silent. Police found $158 on his person and asked him
where he had gotten the money, to which the defendant made no
response.163 At trial, the prosecutor attempted to impeach the
defendant’s testimony by drawing the jury’s attention to his
failure to respond to the police officer’s question about where he
got the money.164 Declining to reach the constitutional question,
the Court held that the silence was inadmissible because “the
probative value of respondent’s pretrial silence was outweighed
by the prejudicial impact of admitting it into evidence. Affirming
the judgment on this ground, we have no occasion to reach the
broader constitutional question . . . ”165
The Hale Court emphasized the unique facts and
circumstances of the defendant’s situation.166 In evaluating the
160 The Advisory Committee, however, has explicitly rejected a balancing
approach to hearsay evidence. “The Advisory Committee has rejected this [case-by-case
balancing] approach to hearsay as involving too great a measure of judicial discretion,
minimizing the predictability of rulings, [and] enhancing the difficulties of preparation for
trial . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 801 advisory committee’s introductory note.
161 United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1975).
162 Id. at 172.
163 Id. at 173-74.
164 Id. at 174.
165 Id. at 173.
166 Id. at 179.
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probative value of the defendant’s silence, the Court noted that
“he had substantial indication that nothing he said would
influence the police decision to retain him in custody” and that
he “knew that the case against him was built on seemingly
strong evidence.”167 Therefore, he “could not have expected the
police to release him merely on the strength of his
explanation.”168 The Court also noted that the defendant had
been given a Miranda warning and was “particularly aware of
his right to remain silent.”169 In other words the defendant had
many other reasons not to speak and his failure to answer the
question was of little probative value.
In assessing the prejudicial value, the Court noted that
“[t]he danger is that the jury is likely to assign much more
weight to the defendant’s previous silence than is
warranted.”170 Moreover, the Court found that “permitting the
defendant to explain the reasons for his silence is unlikely to
overcome the strong negative inference that the jury is likely to
draw from the fact that the defendant remained silent at the
time of his arrest.”171 After concluding that the probative value
of this evidence was substantially outweighed by its danger of
unfair prejudice and confusion, the Court granted the
defendant a new trial.172
2. United States v. Hampton
More recently, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania used Federal Rule of Evidence
403 to reach a decision involving selective silence. In United
States v. Hampton, the government charged a defendant with
being a felon in possession of a firearm.173 Secret Service agents
had conducted a search of the defendant’s home after obtaining
a photograph from defendant’s Facebook profile depicting the
defendant with a gun in his belt.174 After he was arrested, the
defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda rights and took part
in an interview.175 During the interview, the defendant refused

167
168
169
170
171
172
173
174
175

Id.
Id. at 180.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 180.
Id.
Id. at 180-81.
United States v. Hampton, 843 F. Supp. 2d 571, 573 (E.D. Pa 2012).
Id.
Id.
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to answer questions about the recovered firearm.176 He also
refused to identify the gun depicted in the photograph.177
Subsequently, however, the defendant answered a general
question about the photograph and identified himself as the
person in the photograph.178
At trial, the defendant argued that the gun in the
Facebook photograph was a toy.179 In response, the prosecution
sought to enter the defendant’s silence as “evidence that,
having waived his Miranda rights, the defendant failed to
respond to questions put to him about (i) the gun found during
the search [of his house] and (ii) the gun pictured in the
Facebook Photograph.”180 Essentially, the government wanted
to prove that the gun in the photograph was, in fact, a real gun
by pointing to the fact that the defendant had not denied it was
real when asked about it initially.
In considering the admission of the evidence, the court
considered issues of waiver and invocation. For example, the
court stated, “First, Hampton’s ‘selective silence’ may be
admissible since a reasonable jury could find on the facts here
that he waived his Miranda rights, did not remain silent, and
did not unequivocally re-invoke his right to remain silent.”181
The court continued, “Second, despite Hampton’s contention
that his privilege against self-incrimination would be violated,
a reasonabl[e] jury could . . . have found that he waived and did
not re-invoke his Miranda rights.”182
Despite having evaluated whether the defendant
formally re-invoked his right to silence, the court ultimately
based its decision on a Rule 403 analysis.183 After considering
that the defendant “neither confirmed nor denied know[ing]
anything about the gun that was found”184 and having
articulated only one comment, that he was the person in the
photograph, the court found that Hampton’s silence was “only
Id.
Id.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 575.
180 Id. at 574. Hampton’s first trial was declared a mistrial after the jury was
unable to reach a verdict. Id. at 572. During the first trial, the district court sustained
defendant’s objections to the government’s reference to his silence during closing
arguments and “instructed the jury to disregard those references.” Id. at 574. Prior to the
second trial, “the Government filed a motion in limine to admit evidence of defendant’s
choice not to answer certain questions during his custodial interview.” Id. at 572-73.
181 Id. at 577.
182 Id. at 578.
183 Id. at 580.
184 Id. at 576.
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marginally probative” and “an adverse inference would be too
speculative to pass Rule 403 muster.”185
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that “the
probative heft of this silence is offset since [defendant] never
offered an exculpatory story during his interrogation or at trial
from which any inconsistency or ulterior motive could be
inferred.”186 One could read this as indicating that the
probative value of silence increases as a defendant says more
around the silence. Here, the court was able to infer that the
defendant was indeed “wary and cautious”187 and provided an
alternative explanation for his silence.
In assessing the risk of unfair prejudice, the court stated:
Th[e] potential for unfair prejudice is especially grave here because
[defendant] never provided a contradictory statement—or, indeed,
any exculpatory statement—regarding evidence pertinent to his
felon in possession case. As a result, [defendant’s] “story,” in a sense,
has been consistent over the course of this litigation because he
never advanced one.188

Thus, the court, recognizing the low probative value of the
defendant’s selective silence and the substantially high danger
of unfair prejudice, “denied the Government’s motion to admit
and comment on evidence of [defendant’s] silence in its case-inchief and in closing argument.”189
By basing the admissibility of selective silence on
evidentiary considerations, which put the focus on fairness
rather than whether the right was formally re-invoked by the
defendant, the court reached the right result for the right
reason. That is, it spent its time and focus evaluating what, in
this context, based on the facts before it, was fair. Had the
court failed to consider Federal Rule of Evidence 403 it would
only have focused on what the defendant did or did not do to reinvoke his right to silence, and perhaps the idea, or even the
goal, of fairness would have been lost in the inquiry.
CONCLUSION
In both Hale and Hampton, the Supreme Court and the
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
demonstrated that a practical and effective way to determine the
185
186
187
188
189

Id. at 581-82 (alteration in original) (internal quotation mark omitted).
Id. at 582.
Id. at 580.
Id. at 583.
Id.
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admissibility of selective silence is by conducting a careful and
thorough Rule 403 balancing on the record. In doing so, both
courts achieved a fair and rational result. Until the Supreme
Court has the opportunity to address the constitutionality of
prosecutorial use of selective silence, courts should frame the
issue of selective silence as an evidentiary problem, rather than
a constitutional problem. This approach will be practical and
workable. As a result, courts will be able to protect a defendant
from an unfair abuse while simultaneously protecting the truthseeking function of the court.
Michael A. Brodlieb†

† J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2015; B.A. Dartmouth College, 2003. I
would like to thank John D. Moore, Sabrina M. Bierer, Stephen Wohlgemuth, Douglas R.
Keeton, Paola Uriarte, Kaitlyn E. Fallon, Professor Bennett Capers, Makiko Imoto, and
my colleagues on the Brooklyn Law Review for their invaluable help and advice.

